ABSTRACT
In early 1939, the British minister to Albania described what was to be his last annual report as a tale of little but the decay of British interests' in the country. The British recognised no Albanian government-in-exile and endlessly debated whether Zog, the self-proclaimed king of Albania residing in London, and his following at home could be of real value in stimulating resistance against the Italians. The British government remained unmoved and refused to recognise any group as representing Albanian interests. After the Italian invasion of Greece on 28 October 1940, the MOI pressed for an Albanian programme'. Subsequently, the Albanian case posed the challenges of both occupied and satellite countries in a nutshell: the absence of recognised pro-Allied authorities, internecine struggle between rival guerrilla organisations, a collaborationist regime capable of mobilising support, the German ability to play on nationalist aspirations and fear of communist revolution, and, most importantly, no prospect of Allied operations.
