Politics and Strategy

Graham’s hopes for decisive blows in both theatres were only gradually disappointed. This was reflected in his reaction to the rumoured fall of Sevastopol: ‘My hopes rise with respect to Sevastopol; I consider that it was captured on the 25th. We must not flag in the Baltic, if it be possible to follow up the blow in the Black Sea with a fair prospect of success.’ The impact of this unhealthy mixture of wishful thinking and self-deception on the later stages of the Baltic campaign has already been observed. While the euphoria lasted Graham prepared the Anglo-French October Programme for ‘a grand attack on the Russian fortresses in the Baltic next year’. ¹ While the planning was more considered, including specialist craft, it still reflected the knock-out blow school of strategy. Eventually the hard lessons of war forced him to accept the limits of maritime power as an instrument of war. While this new wisdom was closely aligned with the opinions of Dundas and Napier, scapegoats for the failure of the 1854 campaigns, Graham linked his return to basics in strategy with a renewed attack on their reputations. He could shift his ground easily, having always been regarded as the naval expert in cabinet. Even the querulous Russell never doubted his fitness for the post, and when he had the temerity to express himself generally satisfied with the Black Sea fleet Graham was quick to point out Dundas’s inaction on the day of the Alma, allowing the Russians to block the harbour and weakening the battlefleet crews. ² The attack was important because Russell was Dundas’s political leader and, as Prime Minister, had appointed him First Naval Lord and then Commander in Chief Mediterranean. To avoid a rift in the coalition it was essential to discredit Dundas. Graham did not trouble to pass on Dundas’s refutation of these complaints. His cause was lost before they arrived.