ABSTRACT
One of the great ironies of a war notable for its contradictions and anomalies came in May 1987. The American destroyer Stark, one of seven US navy ships then in the Gulf, was sailing alone in the northern part of the waterway when its radar operators detected an Iraqi Mirage plane approaching. There was nothing unusual about that, the navy commander noted later: in the previous nine months the Iraqis had flown 330 missions, launched 90 missiles and hit 40 targets. The Americans were well used to seeing Iraqi planes, and from the briefings of navy headquarters and the state department, looked on Iraq as the friendly power in the Gulf. Even when the Mirage pilot locked his attack radar on to the Stark, no more was done than to issue a second warning not to come too close, and only at the last moment was the order given to activate the Phalanx gun, a weapon which spews out hundreds of rounds in a pattern intended to intercept and explode any missile just before it strikes. It was all too late. Two Exocets got through the ship's defences and hit amidships; thirty-seven crewmen were killed and dozens of others injured.
