ABSTRACT
In the mid 1990s, Johannesburg was still organized on the basis of the separate development policy applied during the apartheid regime. Re equilibrating urban areas thus implied a homogenization of access to essential services, especially in the townships which were dormitory towns on the out skirts of the city populated by non whites and underequipped in basic infra structures. Moreover, infrastructure development was based on racial segregation.1 Within the city of Johannesburg different access to water ser vices were coexisting, ranging from direct connection to a quality network to no connection at all. In 2000, the population of Johannesburg was estimated at three million people. At the time, one third of this population, who lived on an average to high level of income, had access to water via individual connections equipped with post payment meters. Another one third, most of them resident in the township of Soweto, lived on a low level of income and were provided with water without meters for a flat rate based on a
consumption of 20 m3 per month at 125 ZAR.2 The last one third of the population was made up primarily of poor people living in unofficial neigh bourhoods and receiving a minimum level of service for free via tanks or communal standpipes. Transforming these unequal services into a universal system of water provision at the municipal level involved extending the network to cover areas that were not connected. This also meant improving existing poor quality networks, especially in the townships. After apartheid, cities previously divided into white municipalities and black townships were reorganized across the country with a view to ensur ing that local authorities operated in the same conditions, thereby guaran teeing equal treatment for rich and poor in terms of public services (Jaglin, 2003b). The City of Johannesburg was set up by uniting the 11 former municipalities under the umbrella of a single metropolitan authority; however, Johannesburg’s financial position continued to worsen, a process that culminated in bankruptcy in 1997. Supported by the World Bank, the “Igolo 2002” plan was introduced in 1999 with the objective of transform ing Johannesburg into a “world class city”. The plan was intended to mirror at the municipal level the cost recovery policy adopted as part of a wide ranging programme of national development (the “Growth, Employ ment and Redistribution Plan”). Furthermore, the implementation of a service reform programme led the municipality to set up a private company – Johannesburg Water – owned 100 per cent by the city. The company’s mission was to guarantee universal access to water while reducing physical and commercial losses at the municipal level. In 2001, loss through leaks and other causes was estimated at 43 per cent. In the same year, Johannes burg Water signed a five year management contract with a foreign private company, a subsidiary of Suez. This contract was motivated by a number of elements, notably including making improvements to the service, trans forming the company into a financially viable entity in the long term, and incorporating six previously independent entities into a single body with a sole modus operandi. While this management contract was considered internationally as an example of a “successful” public-private partnership (Marin, 2009), it was also subject to a great deal of protest, notably on the part of residents, unions and social movements, which regarded it as a “pri vatization contract”.
