ABSTRACT
From Algiers to Bidart In a context of intense confrontation and violence, the Spanish government sent some messages to ETA in the mid-1980s to show a willingness to talk, but these early contacts were not fruitful.1 While carrying out an aggressive military campaign, ETA progressively theorized about a negotiated settlement, as they were aware that the balance of forces with the Spanish state was highly unfavorable for the Basque group regarding any possibility of military victory. For its part, the Spanish government was willing to combine counter-insurgency policies and ‘dirty war’ with an attempt to enhance the end of ETA’s campaign through talks. In July 1986, the main leader of ETA, Txomin Iturbe, was arrested in the northern Basque Country by the French police, transferred to Gabon, and then deported to Algeria. In Algeria, Iturbe received several Spanish emissaries who told him that the government would be willing to open negotiations if a ceasefire was declared. Iturbe died accidentally in February 1987, and another highranking deported member of ETA, Eugenio Etxebeste “Antton,” was moved from Ecuador to Algeria for the purpose of continuing contact. After some secret conversations, in January 1989 ETA announced a unilateral fifteen-day ceasefire, followed by a bilateral two-month ceasefire agreed with the Spanish government in order to enable further talks. By that time, the Spanish government had secured the support of most of the Spanish and Basque political parties for its dialogue with ETA. Prior to the opening of conversations in Algiers, the PSOE promoted a political agreement, first among the main Spanish political parties, and then among the parties with representation in the Basque parliament, with the exception of HB, which was called the Ajuria Enea Agreement.2 Later, the political parties in Navarre signed a similar agreement. The short-term purpose of the Ajuria Enea Agreement was to support the government’s attempt to end ETA’s campaign through dialogue. According to the agreement, it was legitimate to talk with ETA about the end of the armed activity and its consequences, but not to negotiate politically.3 The second purpose of the pact, although not expressly acknowledged in its text, was to isolate politically the Nationalist Left, especially its electoral coalition, HB. By signing the agreement, the PNV sent an unequivocal signal to the Nationalist Left, as put by
Jeram and Conversi, that “it was willing to work with the ‘enemy’,” i.e., the proSpain parties, “if this meant an end to violence.”4 From January to March 1989, representatives of ETA and the Spanish government held five meetings in Algiers, with the official mediation of the Algerian government. After the fifth meeting, ETA announced in a statement that the two parties had agreed to advance from “conversations” to “negotiations,” and that three ETA prominent prisoners would join the negotiating team. According to ETA’s version, the two sides agreed that the Basque armed group would maintain the ceasefire for a further three months, and the Spanish government would declare its willingness to “achieve a negotiated political solution.” Yet, the government only declared that it was prepared to “achieve an agreed and definitive solution.” ETA believed that the government made that modification to strip the process of its political dimension. The armed group responded with a first ultimatum giving a twenty-four-hour deadline to the government to rectify this, and a second ultimatum increasing it to a further seventy-two hours. That was the end of it. ETA announced in April 4, 1989, that it would resume its armed struggle.5 Later, it became known that there were disagreements between ETA’s leadership in the northern Basque Country, who took a tough position, and the negotiators in Algiers, who were more open to compromise. In any case, over time all sides have acknowledged that there was no real chance for the talks to succeed. The government officials who took part in the conversations and the home minister who directed them, José Luis Corcuera, have recognized that they were not prepared to negotiate about political issues with ETA, but only about issues related to prisoners, refugees, militants in hiding, etc. In addition, they have acknowledged that they did not engage in those talks expecting to reach any agreement, but hoping to show the world, especially France and the European Union, that the Spanish government did try to settle the conflict and ETA was not prepared to compromise. Finally, they have stated that they were convinced that a failure of the negotiations and a resumption of the armed activity would damage the armed group much more than the government, who had the political support of all the opposition, including the leading Basque party PNV.6 Meanwhile, the ETA of the 1980s would never accept an agreement limited to prisoners and other ‘technical’ issues. The armed group would only permanently cease hostilities in exchange for some significant political advancement toward the implementation of the KAS Alternative, which included the recognition of the right to self-determination. ETA and the Nationalist Left later developed an auto-critical discourse regarding the Algiers process, arguing that the movement was not sufficiently prepared to face that process, and that it was mistakenly taken as an all-or-nothing bet instead of the first step of a progressive process.7 Currently, ETA, reflecting on the Algiers process, recognizes that “it has to be acknowledged that there was not enough maturity [on our side].”8 In any case, although ETA lost the battle for public opinion after the failure of the process, the fact that the Spanish government recognized ETA’s representatives as negotiators was regarded as a partial symbolic victory.
