ABSTRACT
Success narrative Nobody claims that ETA has ended because of a military success. The Basque group has achieved neither its final goals of independence and socialism, nor the tactical pre-condition previously given for the abandonment of the armed campaign, namely the recognition of the right to self-determination. In this regard, the Basque case is not unique. According to all studies, success is by far the least frequent outcome of the end of terrorist groups. Data from Audrey K. Cronin, who investigated 457 terrorist groups active since 1968, shows that fewer than 5 percent of the groups have fully succeeded in achieving their goals.1 According to data from Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, who examined 648 organizations active between 1968 and 2006, only 10 percent ended because their goals had been achieved.2 Leonard Weinberg, who bases his findings on a study of 433 groups that were active between 1900 and 2006, does not give specific percentages for the frequency of each pattern of ending, but he asserts that success is very rare.3 Success and defeat, however, are relative terms. The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland can be considered a success by the Republicans, because to some extent it was a consequence of the IRA’s violent campaigns and ceasefires. On the other hand, Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom, which is a failure for the IRA. In short, the IRA achieved some of its aims, but it has not achieved its final goal. The same can be said about PLO or Hezbollah. The military campaigns under the umbrella of the PLO during the 1970s and 1980s resulted in official recognition of the Palestinian nation by the United Nations and the visibility of the Palestinian cause on the worldwide stage. Hezbollah and its allies arguably provoked the withdrawal of the American and French forces from Beirut and, along with other factors, the withdrawal of Israel from all of Lebanon. Yet, the Palestinian state has not been established in a way satisfactory to the PLO, and Israel has not been destroyed, as Hezbollah had aimed to do. Total victories are rare, but partial success occurs more often. As Cronin puts it, short-term tactical successes tend to reinforce the use of violent means, because they seem to show that they work.4 ETA’s history confirms Cronin’s findings about the consequences of tactical successes. The killing of Admiral
Carrero Blanco by ETA in 1973 is regarded as a decisive strike against the continuation of the dictatorship. 5 Carrero Blanco’s killing clearly reinforced the military faction within ETA and became a strong argument for advocates of the effectiveness of armed tactics. As stressed by Garmendia, the success of the attack on Carrero Blanco meant that “militarism” was not in question.6 In the early 1980s, ETA managed to halt the construction of a nuclear plant through a violent campaign, in combination with mass demonstrations.7 This was another partial and tactical victory that strengthened the argument in favor of the continuation of the political-military strategy. Jones and Libicki note that the chance to succeed is higher when the group has narrow goals, such as policy change or territorial change, and not broader goals, such as regime change or worldwide revolution.8 ETA had very broad goals in the 1960s and 1970s, as it pursued overthrowing the dictatorship through an insurrectional war, seizing power, and guiding a revolutionary process in a Basque independent state. The Basque group adopted a more realistic approach from the 1980s, and pursued a strategy aimed at forcing the Spanish state to negotiate with the armed group and recognize the right to self-determination. This was a narrow goal with a higher chance of success than the previous broader goal. Yet, it did not work either. Nevertheless, there are narratives claiming a history of political success for ETA. The Basque group itself and the Nationalist Left argue that their struggle has been a success, because it led the majority of Basque society to claim the right for the Basques to determine their political status. They claim that ETA’s armed struggle has reinforced Basque political identity and the wish for an independent state. Discussing ETA’s achievements is a sensitive matter. Advocating armed struggle is a crime in Spain, and a person who openly argued that ETA’s actions were politically effective could be prosecuted. Consequently, ETA members or supporters usually refrain from bluntly explaining why they believe their struggle was worth it. When I asked former ETA militants what the armed group had achieved, a common reply is that it kept “the flame” alive. This is what Aranzadi contends when he acknowledges, from an ideologically opposite perspective, that ETA overall obtained “an outstanding military failure but an unquestionable symbolical success,” because it regenerated Basque nationalism and reshaped the standards of Basque ethnicity “by manipulating death.”9 Indeed, former militants who are proud of their past activism tend to mention the symbolic dimension of ETA’s legacy, although in more practical terms. A former ETA militant argues that maintaining “the flame of this people” is no small achievement in “these times of globalization.” According to him, the Basque Country would now be a region fully integrated into Spain, with no identity, if it had not been for ETA’s struggle. Another former militant sticks to the same idea when asked about the achievements of ETA: “The endurance of a people.” He argues that the political debate would not be where it is now if it had not been for the armed resistance. “Enduring until today,” and being in a position to achieve the same objectives by other means: these are the consequences of the armed struggle, according to him.
Another former ETA member argues that a debate on sovereignty is now open, among other factors, thanks to the “political action of ETA and the whole Nationalist Left.” Another former militant regards ETA’s armed insurgency as a contribution to Basque history. He argues that rebellious Basque people have arisen at every historic crossroads “to fight for the people.” In this regard, ETA has fulfilled “an historic stage” in the path toward Basque independence. According to him, the result of ETA’s struggle is that now they can say “here we are.”10 In summary, they regard ETA’s long armed campaign as worthwhile because they believe that their struggle has been a decisive factor in opening a political scenario in which achieving independence through political means is a real possibility. The Nationalist Left and ETA itself have elaborated this narrative in a more articulate way in many documents. The Argitzen report-backed by the majority of the rank and file of the Nationalist Left in their internal debate in 2009 and 2010-regards as a victory the fact that the political framework drawn up after the end of Francoism has not stabilized. “We sustained a chance for a deep democratic change (. . .). We brought the Basque Country to the gates of political change. Thirty years later, the door for change is completely open.”11 Rufi Etxeberria, one of the most prominent promoters of the shift within the Nationalist Left, used a telling expression in an interview at the time of their internal debate: “It is the time to collect the fruits of long years of struggle, and not to let them waste.”12 In their last internal bulletin, Zutabe 113,13 ETA acknowledged that the outcome of their struggle had not been a victory,
