ABSTRACT
It confers the capacity to use the sea while denying that use to the adversary, command of the sea is usually important and sometimes crucial at the strategic level of war. Ways of limiting or outflanking a stronger adversary's capacity to command the sea or to exploit that command has been a constant preoccupation of weaker fleets. Achieving sea control is by no means restricted to the military-technical 'kinetic' side of things. More competitive interpretations of sea control can also be advanced by non-kinetic political or legal means. The third 'warfare' is psychological – namely seeking to raise levels of concern amongst the Americans themselves of putting their forces into areas of hazard. In this area, perceptions of the effectiveness of Chinese sea-denial weaponry is key. The linkage between victory or defeat in battle and the capacity to use the sea for strategic purposes is evidently more complicated than might be deduced from a simplistic reading of Mahan.
