ABSTRACT
This chapter examines two prominent versions of event-causal libertarianism. The first is Mark Balaguer's elegantly simple account, and the second is Robert Kane's more complex story. Libertarians tend to be strongly committed to incompatibilism, and so the force of this pragmatic argument for accepting libertarianism would depend on the practical palatability of the incompatibilist alternative, free will skepticism. According to libertarian views, every human being has the ability to act freely in the sense relevant to free will. Crucial to an action's being free in this sense is that it not be causally determined by factors beyond the agent's control. Recent times have witnessed the explicit differentiation of three major versions of libertarianism, the event-causal, non-causal, and agent-causal types. The chapter present each of these views together with their problems and prospects. A prominent family of objections to libertarianism develops the idea that a non-deterministic history of an action precludes an agent's being morally responsible for it.
