ABSTRACT
This chapter considers three distinct arguments for source incompatibilism. In each case, one can see how the argument lends support to Basic Source Argument for Incompatibilism (BSI). The first argument is the Ultimacy Argument for Incompatibilism, which aims to establish as a condition on free and morally responsible actions that they ultimately originate from exercises of one's own agency and not in causal conditions external to her. The second argument, the Direct Argument for Incompatibilism, is designed to show that under the assumption of determinism, non-responsibility for the remote past and the laws of nature transfers through to non-responsibility for what one does. The third argument, the Manipulation Argument for Incompatibilism, contends that causal determination is no different in any relevant respect from a form of manipulation that clearly undermines an agent's freedom and moral responsibility. Ultimacy Argument, was to be distinguished from an incompatibilist-friendly ultimacy thesis of the sort incompatibilists like Kane or Pereboom have endorsed.
