ABSTRACT
The impact of Soviet trade and aid on Middle East politics is usually overrated. Economic relations between the Soviet Union and most Middle East countries have greatly expanded during the last decade, but with a few important exceptions they are still on a substantially smaller scale than Middle East trade with the West. Soviet development aid is still less than https://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> 1 10 https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9781315622491/d41078c1-3348-4197-960c-1839c6b2b009/content/equ1_B.tif" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/> of one percent of the national income of the Communist country. Commercial transactions per se have not yielded a marked increase in Soviet political influence. The one important exception is the supply of arms, which both in monetary value and in political significance has been the most important Soviet export. From 1954 to 1966 the Soviet Union provided about $2 billion in arms and military equipment to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Yemen; between June 1967 and October 1968 deliveries reportedly totalled $2.5 billion. During the same period (1954–1967) credits totalling $2 billion were extended to the Middle East, of which, however, it is thought only between one-third and one-half has actually been drawn by the recipients. Soviet military aid, in other words, has been from four to five times greater than economic assistance. While a great deal has been written in Russia during the last decade on the theory and practice of Soviet aid, Soviet arms supplies are never discussed and there are no official figures. The following outline deals only with non-military Soviet aid, politically and economically the less important aspect of trade relations.
