ABSTRACT
This chapter serves an introductory function, aiming at a relatively general outline of the specifically Rescherian position in the contemporary debates over realism. One of the most remarkable features of the kind of pragmatism committed to advancing scientific rationality and objectivity that Nicholas Rescher has defended for several decades is its attempt to maintain a balance of a number of philosophical ideas that are often thought to be in tension with each other. The chapter examines the Rescherian attempt to overcome the potential conflicts between realism, idealism, and pluralism. The Rescherian objective pragmatist's "reality principle" can be considered self-subsistent and person-indifferent, but Jamesian or Deweyan pragmatists need not be irresponsible subjectivists or relativists. Rescher's most problematic, and presumably the most important, division lies between "thesis pragmatism" and "method pragmatism". The latter, he subscribes to, urges that pragmatic considerations ought to be applied to methods and procedures employed in the validation of theses, not to theses themselves.
