ABSTRACT
This chapter articulates Ramsey's dispositional theory of belief, and defends it against charge that it cannot account for contemporary problem of attitude divergence. It shows how Ramsey's theory of belief easily extends to account for attitude divergence. The chapter articulates the intellectualist's analysis of attitude divergence, and explains how this analysis provides ammunition for challenge to behavior-based accounts. A behavior-based theory like Ramsey's is consistent with our practices of belief attribution, where we attribute beliefs to individuals on basis of what they say and do. The chapter discusses that debate between intellectualism and dispositionalism lies not in either theory's inability to account for attitude divergence, but rather in conflicting theoretical assumptions about belief, which drive competing empirical interpretations. In the spirit of much of Nicholas Rescher's own work, an account like this one addresses contemporary problems by drawing on historical sources. The chapter argues that Ramsey's theory can easily account for cases of attitude divergence and phenomenon of "implicit" attitudes.
