ABSTRACT
The Treaty of Paris – which was to establish a European Defence Community (EDC) – was rejected in the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954. The fi ve other signatory states had already ratifi ed the treaty, and it was incumbent on the French parliament to pass it. The proposal under consideration – which French Prime Minster René Pleven had tabled in 1950 – contained measures to rearm West Germany while embedding it in a European institutional framework and army. Although the proposal had been initiated by France and counted on US support, 1 it laid bare a ‘new cleavage on Europe,’ especially in France. 2 Political elites and the French public were deeply divided about the idea of creating a common European army with German participation only nine years after the end of World War II. 3 Communists and Gaullists were adamant in their absolute opposition to the EDC, while other mainstream parties were internally divided on the issue. 4 Nationalist sentiments eventually combined with ‘anti-federalist opinion,’ 5 as well as the painful memories of the German occupation of France, preventing the ratifi cation of the EDC by a substantial parliamentary majority. 6
The French parliamentary rejection of the Treaty of Paris was a shock and setback for the early supporters of European integration. 7 While the issue of West German rearmament was settled soon after by incorporating the newly created Bundeswehr into NATO and the WEU, 8 the early hopes for and optimism about the prospects for European cooperation and unity had taken a major hit. 9 Moreover, the episode illustrated the extent to which many politicians across Europe remained wary of Germany and its rearmament, and sought further mechanisms to contain it. 10
Despite this setback, an idea for a new approach to integration came about as soon as the heated French debate about the EDC had subsided. Since September 1954, the United States had repeatedly tried to commit European governments to not giving up on the path of integration. 11 In early 1955, Dutch and Belgian policy-makers circulated fi rst plans for a new effort at European integration, focusing this time on the economy. In the eyes of the Dutch and Belgians, the EDC plan had failed because it had been over-ambitious. Their remedy was a more cautious approach. Future efforts at political integration
12 oblique’ economic forms of integration necessary. Political unifi cation of Europe was now to be accommodated in non-supranational arrangements for economic integration, with nation-states wielding heavy infl uence over future decisionmaking processes. 14 In a 4 April 1955 memo from Dutch Foreign Minister Johan Beyen to his Belgian counterpart, Paul-Henri Spaak, the fi rst sketches of a new initiative aiming at the creation of a European Common Market were drawn up. 15
Also in reaction to the EDC debacle, Jean Monnet, the president of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) High Authority and a driving force of integration in his own right, resigned in February 1955. Monnet wanted to establish an informal elite lobby group so as to exercise indirect infl uence over a network of key players in regards to pro-integrationist European policies. 16 One of his main successes was to get the support of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) for his pet project, Euratom. Needing a replacement for Monnet, the foreign ministers of the six ECSC countries met in the Sicilian resort of Messina from 1-3 June 1955 to discuss Monnet’s successor and the Dutch-Belgian proposals. 17
The core aim of this initiative was a process of gradual horizontal – and not sectoral – economic integration. 18 This entailed abolishing intra-European tariffs and quotas, creating a customs union, establishing a common external tariff, and harmonising economic policies. The intention was to stay clear of sensitive military and political issues as well as the more narrow, industry-specifi c approach of previous integration efforts (such as in coal and steel). Due to the EDC fi asco, a viable new alternative for integration was sought. 19
In spite of its economic nature, the Common Market proposal contained an important political dimension. It was expected that economic integration would produce ‘closer relations’ between member states, thereby gradually heightening the interdependence among them to such an extent that war would become unthinkable. 20 The promoters were ‘highly conscious’ of these aims and their political implications. 21 This new technical pattern for integration proposed starting with a customs union and economic integration, through which closer political cooperation would gradually emerge. 22 Messina was thus regarded as the beginning of a new attempt at integrating Western Europe through economic means. The conference posited practical and immediate objectives for incremental economic integration, 23 yet ultimately aimed at ‘selling’ political integration through economic means, thus achieving political ‘integration through stealth.’ 24 Spaak in particular sought to ‘masquerade’ the proposals’ political essence. 25
Horizontal economic integration was not a popular move, since it would mean stronger economic competition, further liberalisation, and an end to protectionism and dirigisme . 26 Especially in Fourth Republic France, which was by then perceived as the ‘sick man of Europe,’ 27 there were numerous reservations in economic circles, which were steeped in a tradition of state intervention and protectionism. 28 In addition, the public mood in France for European
worsening confl ict in Algeria. If this had not been enough, Britain’s ambivalent attitude and reluctance to participate in European initiatives, 30 as well as the strong growth in West German economic power and public confi dence, which troubled many of its neighbours, did not augur well for the prospects of the Messina proposals. 31 To make any new integrationist initiative succeed, substantial political will would have to be marshalled.
