ABSTRACT
European integration needs to be thought of as a process shaped by the interaction of structural and ideational factors, leaders’ divergent interpretations of their interests and preferences, and diverging legacies, as well as and ideas and conceptions about Europe and a country’s place in it. From the point of view of the diplomatic historian, as Thomas Otte explains,
every political action, be it in actual deed or in the shape of a policy recommendation, is based on a set of premises, preconceived values and axioms . . . Decision-makers are mostly guided by ‘their own instinctive reactions, traditions and modes of behaviour.’ They are the products of their age, their national traditions and social environments; they are infl uenced by the prevailing modes of thought of their time . . . The key to a more thorough understanding of the past lies in these broad assumptions, the ‘thought-world’ and intellectual coordinates of policy-makers and their advisers. 1
The intention of this book is to reveal those sets of contexts and relationships which facilitated the emergence of particular milestones of European integration, which can only be fruitfully undertaken if decision-makers are placed at the heart of these contexts and relationships. After all, they are the ones who frame, represent, and negotiate their respective national positions, and they are the ones who ultimately choose one set of policies over another. Naturally, the ‘socio-political environment limits considerably the individual’s freedom to choose political roles and actions.’ 2 But this does not mean that leaders did not have to make choices or take risks. Gillian Peele reminds us that it is central to the task of the political scientist not only to depend on ‘explanatory power’
the issue of agency and explore the difference made by key actors.’ Furthermore, it is imperative not to overlook and under-research the personal relationship between leaders. 4
Little is gained by merely producing an actor-centric narrative of European integration, in which leaders play a uniquely heroic role. 5 The frequent distinction between ‘villains and heroes’ 6 is not useful, as leadership is not an innately moral or normative category. Leaders – even supposedly good ones – break the rules, deceive, misinform, and lie, and there are plenty of historical anecdotes to back this up. 7 The intention should not be to determine whether someone was a good or bad European leader, but to examine why and how someone chose a particular European policy initiative, invested signifi cant political capital and risk into it, disregarded potential viable alternatives, or decided against another path of action.
