ABSTRACT
In one of the few autobiographical passages in his works F. H. Bradley tells us that already, in 1879 and before William James’s articles in Mind of that year had appeared, he had learned from Hegel the doctrine of “feeling as vague continuum below relations” and grasped its vital importance. Relations have been shown if taken by themselves to be in end self-contradictory and therefore “appearance”; and Bradley is going on to apply same measure to thought as involving them. Bradley is too deeply pledged to Hegelian doctrine of the “Other”, that thought sets up, to propose to solve difficulty by renouncing it. He agrees that, if reality were quite beyond intellectual apprehension, it would be self-contradictory to assert that thought fails to reach it. Nineteenth-century idealism in England had its origin largely in attempt to vindicate reality of will and feeling, and in its later teaching had found itself particularly at home in interpretation of social and political life.
