ABSTRACT
The emergence of Gestalt psychology is richly documented (e.g., Boring, 1950; Henle, 1980; Hochberg, 1979; Wertheimer, 1974). Its refutations of atomism, associationism, and structuralism are well known, and its impact on psychology would be difficult to deny. Yet, Gestalt psychology never reached the pinnacle of popularity in America enjoyed by behaviorism, nor was it subsumed intact into modern cognitive psychology when the latter began to surface in the late 1950s. Wolfgang Köhler (1959), one of the founders of Gestalt psychology, felt rather strongly that Gestalt theory had been neglected—neither disproved nor transformed in any meaningful way. In direct contrast, Helson (1969) (a supporter of the Gestalt school) suggested that Gestalt psychology succeeded because it influenced the field of psychology more than any other theoretical outlook either prior to or contemporaneous with it. In 1964 Hilgard suggested that Gestalt psychology had been so thoroughly integrated into modern psychology that it was no longer recognizable as something that could be contrasted with other positions. Even prior to Köhler’s proclaimed defeat, Boring (1950) felt that it had “died of its own success.”
