Conclusion

This study has examined the Hamas media strategy from 1987 to the present. In so doing, it situated the development of the media strategy within its proper contextual setting. The contextual setting encompassed historical, intellectual and political developments. This is because everything emerges within and is impacted by the environment, including how internal and external variables directly and indirectly affect the development of a counter-hegemonic narrative. Hamas’s media institutions were created within existing cultural-hegemonic frames – one dominated by the Israeli Occupation and another by the PLO. Creating a niche within the existing and competing cultural and ideological frameworks required the development and presentation of a counter-narrative. Hamas had to create an alternative media framework, a new media hegemony. This process – the creation of a new media hegemony – is what the study sought to examine, extrapolate and explore. Media is a space in which tension and contradiction is fiercely vented through the propagation of opposing cultural projects. Literally, there is a competition through the medium of the press, radio, satellite TV, television and the internet that is primarily geared toward winning the hearts and minds of the Palestinian public. This research has argued that the widespread use of media demonstrates its importance and priority within Hamas’s overall strategy. It has shown that Hamas has developed a comprehensive media strategy over the past two decades, which is based on four pillars. These pillars are the media infrastructure, media message, target audience, and objectives. Each pillar was examined to analyse, learn and understand the development and evolution of Hamas’s media strategy. Through this examination, several major findings can be articulated. The first is that the Hamas media discourse is concentrated on one key idea, namely the idea of ‘Islamic resistance’. The relationship between the discourse and the centrality of the concept of Islamic resistance is the founding idea of Hamas. The Hamas media utilised the discourse of resistance during all its stages, even in different contexts. Specifically, it used this idea as an underground/secret resistance movement during the first intifada, when it adopted the mantle of political opposition after the Oslo Agreement, and when it came to power. Throughout these historically contextualised periods, the resistance discourse took different shapes. Thus, discourse is shaped by and also

shapes context. This is most evident when the two dimensions of resistance within the Hamas media, namely the political and the ideological/religious, were examined. The latter was used to a lesser extent after the 2006 elections. This supports the finding that Hamas pragmatically and strategically adapts its discourse to context. The discourse of resistance also generated a new Hamasbranded terminology, all of which has served the idea of resistance. The evolving nature and variance of the concepts and discourse used over the three historically contextualised periods are evident in another major finding of this project, namely that pertaining to the target audience. The second major finding was that Hamas has progressively expanded the circle of its media target audience over the last twenty years. It went from local to national, from national to regional, and from regional to international. Granted the evolution was not so linear as might appear: there was variance, peaks and regressions from the upward, evolutionary trend, which correlated to specific crises. Because of this, it is best to conceptualise the target audience in networked circles that are independent and interdependent from one another. The Hamas media has five target audience circles that are in operation at the various levels. The first circle is the Hamas members and supporters; the second circle is the Palestinian public; the third circle is the Arab and Muslim public; the fourth circle is international public opinion; and, finally, the fifth circle is Israel. As the study concluded, Hamas takes into consideration the specificity of each group of the target audience, especially in terms of when and how to address each of them and the type of discourse to be used. Several examples highlighted in Chapters 4 to 6 also permit the conclusion that discourse which transcends boundaries carries greater symbolic meaning and power, thus permitting Hamas to attain greater levels of political and ideological/religious gains. Like discourse and target audience, objectives impact development and are driven in part by context. The third major finding of this study demonstrates that setting objectives is an important component of the Hamas media strategy. In particular, there were two specific types. The first type comprises short term/tactical objectives. They are subject to the context in that they serve particular purposes in particular contexts. This is clearly supported by the finding that Hamas adapts its discourse to the context. The second type comprises long-term/strategic objectives, which represent Hamas’s overall media objectives. In the latter type, there were three strategic objectives. The first was the legitimisation of Hamas’s resistance and the de-legitimisation of the Israeli occupation. The second strategic objective was the mobilisation of the masses according to the Hamas agendas. The third strategic objective was the use of psychological warfare. Psychological warfare was used positively to target Hamas members in particular and Palestinian people in general for the purpose of recruitment and to raise their morale. It was also used against the Israelis in general and the Israeli soldiers in particular, to wear them down and to intimidate. Obviously, both types of objectives are connected to one another and serve the overall objectives of Hamas’s project. The last finding, which the others were leading up to, was the gradual development of Hamas’s media infrastructure. Its development was evolutionary and,

today, it is most appropriate to refer to it as the Hamas media empire. The research demonstrated how the media infrastructure significantly developed over the course of twenty years, beginning with the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 and continuing to the present time. The media infrastructure is centralised and led by a media department that operates in accordance with instructions from the political leadership. This media department is in charge of all the Hamas media institutions. Hamas used all of the available media outlets at each stage in this study. It used rudimentary media outlets during the first intifada, including leaflets, posters, graffiti, pamphlets and the mosques. Taking advantage of the margin of freedom after the establishment of the PNA in 1994, it built up its media institutions to include the print media (newspapers), and electronic media (radio, TV, internet). Hamas also established media companies under the banner of the ‘independent media’ as part of its expansion efforts. One of the most important things this evolution in particular demonstrates is that Hamas makes a significant effort to utilise non-Hamas media institutions, including the international news agencies and the news networks and through ongoing communication with journalists and representatives of the international media. Furthermore, Hamas has awakened to the importance of social media. This was the case especially after the Arab Spring and the role it played. Hamas urges its media institutions, leaders and members to be connected with such media networks.