ABSTRACT
Introduction The collapse of CAPRE and the transfer of control over the informatics policy from the Secretariat of Planning to the National Security Council would seem to portend rather dramatic changes in the character of the policy itself. There was indeed some confusion and uncertainty over the direction of the policy during the first year or two of SEI’s existence as well as a certain shift of emphasis from economic autonomy to the strategic significance (in an almost military sense) of developing Brazil’s technological capacity in informatics. Overall, however, there was remarkable continuity of policy in the transition from CAPRE to SEI. The continued presence of important members of the CAPRE group inside SEI and the growing role of the CAPRE-created association of national producers, ABICOMP, produced a convergence of philosophy with the new SNI (military intelligence agency) group that was reflected in the deepening of the market reserve policy. The market reserve for minicomputers was continued and then extended downward even more aggressively to the emerging microcomputer sector. The market reserve was also extended upward to superminicomputers, although in a more cautious form than the CAPRE group probably would have pursued. Similarly cautious forms of market reserve extended the concept across a variety of informatics-related industries, including peripheral equipment, industrial automation, digital instrumentation, semiconductors, and software. This convergence of the old and the new policy groups would culminate in an institutionalization of the market reserve with the passage of the 1984 Informatics Law, engineered by a grand (and rather improbable) alliance of the military regime’s national security apparatus (mobilized by SEI) and the chief opponents of the military regime in the national Congress (mobilized by ABICOMP and its allies). This general continuity of policy, however, was generated by a substantially different policy process and a substantially different set of mechanisms for insulating the policy from its enemies than had prevailed during the CAPRE period. To use and extend Emanuel Adler’s metaphor, the CAPRE-SEI transition marked the end of the “guerrilla” phase of the informatics policy and the beginning of a new phase of set battles involving regular forces and conventional heavy artillery. CAPRE had assiduously cultivated a low profile and patiently
constructed almost invisible coalitions through the quiet persuasion of the representatives of strategic agencies on the CAPRE council. SEI, on the other hand, was aggressive about assuming command and using all of its national securitybased political resources to extend its authority to areas that other parts of the state apparatus considered their exclusive turf. Where CAPRE had seduced, SEI assaulted; where CAPRE had requested cooperation, SEI demanded compliance; and where CAPRE had insinuated initiatives, SEI promulgated decrees. This shift in political style ran directly counter to the general political liberalization that was underway at the level of the regime as a whole and would eventually have to give way to new tactics. From its apparently secure position inside the national security apparatus in 1979, SEI was disinclined to listen to dissenting voices even from within the military government, let alone from civil society. By 1984, however, political liberalization had changed the landscape so fundamentally that SEI found it necessary to seek ratification of its policy and authority from the Congress and, in the process, felt compelled to look for allies within the opposition parties. Sources of political support that seemed irrelevant in 1979 had by 1984 become indispensable. SEI’s agility in adapting its bases of political support to the changing political context meant that the 1984 Informatics Law was a high-water mark of sorts for the policy. However, the institutionalization of the market reserve tended to obscure the fact that, from an economic and technological point of view, the policy was increasingly problematic. As SEI’s political capacity led to the expansion of the market reserve in a way that affected more and more segments of Brazilian industry, opposition to the consequences of the policy was also expanding. For its successors in the civilian government that followed from 1985 on, SEI had left a growing list of powerful enemies. To a considerable extent, its very successes set the stage for its own eventual disintegration.
