ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the second dimension of engagement and concentrates on an assessment of the role and impact of international agencies on China's negotiation preference decision-making. Policymakers use the weight of international agencies to their own advantage in the domestic inter-agency bargaining process. Rationalists argue that international agencies influence Chinese economic diplomacy preference formation through an incentive restructuring process that involves assisting Beijing in determining a best outcome among different equilibria situations where more than one efficient solution exists. In contrast to rationalists, cognitivists downplay the factor of interests and claim that Chinese decision-makers hold imperfect information and tentative policy preferences when they enter political processes. By establishing close relationships with various domestic actors, the long-term effect is an empowerment of those actors against others in the internal inter-agency bargaining process. The influence of the international agencies is conditioned, as expected, by a range of situational factors and stable conditions, including consensus-driven preference formation, and informal politics.
