ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses the problem of how there can be mental causes in the physical domain that are not themselves physical. It considers the qua problem concerning the properties that a cause involves. The chapter discusses the qua problem concerning property aspects. It also discusses the qua problem concerning properties of property-instantiations. The causal closure argument combines the premise that there is psychophysical causation with two further premises to yield the conclusion that mental causes are identical with physical causes. To explain the qua problem involving second-order properties: The conclusion of the causal closure argument is that mental causes are identical with physical causes. According to Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald, the claim that there is no qua problem if causes are property-instantiations and mental property-instantiations are identical with physical property-instantiations is false. A mental cause is the instantiation of a mental property by a substance and a physical cause is the instantiation of a physical property by a substance.
