ABSTRACT
The epistemic/non-epistemic values distinction has played an important role in recent decades in debates about the roles of different kinds of values in science. A distinction may be useful as a broad categorization without lending itself to a sharp delineation, though such a delineation may be required for specific contexts. The epistemic/non-epistemic distinction is quite analogous. It may be useful, for example, as an initial broad categorization that helps us distinguish scientific inquiry from other forms of inquiry. Non-epistemic values are often grouped together as an undifferentiated assortment ranging from personal values to social, political, religious, and aesthetic values. There are clear limitations in treating all of these values as a uniform group, certainly with respect to their possible relationships to scientific inquiry. Efforts to establish it as a sharp distinction have inspired important, careful studies of specific science projects and developments, even if those same studies ultimately led to a questioning of the sharpness of the distinction itself.
