ABSTRACT
This chapter aims to shed light on the connection between perception, aspect-perception, recognition, evaluation, appreciation and judgments, in three respects. It meets its legitimate challenge, namely to explain Wittgenstein's obsession with aspect-perception without imputing the ubiquity thesis. At this juncture it is tempting to take explanation of Wittgenstein's preoccupation one step further: for Wittgenstein aspect-perception was integral to all perception. In order to assess the ubiquity thesis, it is helpful to distinguish possible stances on the relation between perception, aspect-perception and interpretation. It requires not just that all perception is aspect-perception but two further points: aspect-perception is a simpler or more tractable phenomenon than perception; capable of explaining the latter but not the other way around. But now, if what is partly constitutive of running, for example differs between humans and animals, then what is constituted must differ as well.
