ABSTRACT
I have examined what Popper called the “unconscious” relationship between theory of knowledge and a view of history and politics. This concern, along with his interest in science, led him to formulate a broad philosophical understanding of reason and the role of hypotheses and criticism. Now I turn more specifically to the metaphysical viewpoints about history that Popper rejects. In spite of his avowed position, specifically his position against relativism, I consider Popper’s philosophy of history a motivation for the rise of historicism in recent philosophy. I will argue that Popper’s refutation of historicism was actually a refutation of realism in the social sciences and specifically a realist account of historical explanation. In an effort, however, to salvage the idea of the social sciences Popper developed what he called a “logic of the situation” or “zero model of rational construction” which emphasized instrumental or conventional standards of historical reconstruction and the importance of the distinction between reasons and causes. These themes led, contrary to Popper’s intention, to revived interest in historicist epistemology. Thus Popper’s views encouraged and provided the motivation for positions about the history of knowledge and science that he would later dismiss as relativist and sceptical. His original arguments against historicism led then to an account of historical reconstruction.
