ABSTRACT
Chapter eight, “Conclusion,” argues there is an inherent value to human life, based on biologically based capacities of humankind—such as language. Drawing on John Searle’s defense of human rights, this value ought to be protected by “negative” and “positive” freedoms out of theory-practice consistency, which extends from the “self” to “other.” Alasdair McIntyre’s work on virtue ethics provides the linkage between a “fact” of human existence and its “functioning,” which thus introduces a teleological framework of human potentialities, exercised for better or worse, and hence provides an ontological basis for their value. Drawing on Christian Smith’s work, this argument is recast in terms of his theory of “personalism,” concerning (1) the respect for the dignity of others as an onto-ethical concept and practice; (2) the force of causal responsibility for the consequences of unintended “negative goods” generated through one’s practices; and (3) the brokenness of human beings, concerning psychological disorder and social alienation. Supporting arguments draw on a conception of human “concrete universals,” the nature of “power,” and ways the ethical thrust of dialectical critical realist philosophy and social theory enables one to think through and act to change the world.
