ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the strategic cultural dimension(s) of the Anglo-American special relationship (AASR). It introduces the relative importance of 'affect' for the functioning of the AASR, a putatively recent line of inquiry among certain International Relations (IR) scholars. Institutionalism and Emotionalism were adumbrated in Winston Churchill's March 1946 speech in Missouri, and for symbolic reasons alone a case might be made for considering the Fulton address as a logical point of departure for any strategic– cultural assessment of the AASR. One need not invoke strategic culture to undertake a demonstration, and indeed many scholars have happily eschewed the rubric altogether, when they advance claims about the specialness of the Anglo-American alliance, often dependent upon particular modes of sharing, in both military technology – namely nuclear weaponry – and intelligence. What occurred with respect to political culture did not take long to recur in connection with strategic culture.
