ABSTRACT

This chapter analyses Winston Churchill's concept of an Anglo-American 'special relationship' as set out in the Fulton speech and the reaction to it in the United States, especially the criticism, put forward by Walter Lippmann, among others, that British colonialism was a significant constraint upon an openly close relationship with the US. It evaluates the political debate within the US on the Fulton speech that continued for several years after it was delivered. The chapter examines what has been called 'the descent to Suez', focusing mainly on the period from Churchill's retirement in April 1955, and the extent to which the Suez crisis can be linked to the flaws in Churchill's Fulton vision, notwithstanding the best efforts of Makins and his predecessors to maintain a close Anglo-American relationship. The significance of the United States and of the role of the ambassador in Washington to the successful operation of British foreign policy from 1940 can hardly be overstated.