ABSTRACT
One of the most central questions to middle class studies in China is its socio political role. In light of China’s rapid socioeconomic change following the market reforms, there is contestation over whether the emerging middle class in China will follow the footsteps of their Western counterparts and advocate for democ racy due to their increased size, strength, education and ability to participate in public affairs (Lipset 1959; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Mills 2002), or whether they will become supporters of the state like their counterparts in other developing countries, which is largely responsible for shaping their existence (Johnson 1985; Jones and Brown 1994). For the most part, academic opinion on China have veered towards the latter. Studies have shown that despite a univer sality in rights consciousness among Chinese citizens, the middle class have not translated such consciousness into support for political freedom (Chen and Lu 2011), nor are they willing to engage in active political confrontations despite greater utilisation of informal networks and activities in managing conflict with authorities (Tang 2011). It has also been argued that the middle class, particu larly the ‘old middle class’, are more interested in securing its economic freedom than political freedom; hence, they are supportive of a centralised technocracy (Sonoda 2010). In certain ways, the middle class and the state can be seen to share fundamental interests: promotion of economic growth, protection of private prop erty, maintenance of social stability and restriction of mass political participation, especially of the lower classes (Chen 2002). Yet, little work has been done on the formulation of the middle class sociopolitical outlook, in the context of how they experience, normalise and internalise sociopolitical events around them, and how they arrive at their paradoxical attitudes.
