ABSTRACT
Despite all the slogans put out by Japan in World War II about Asian unity and solidarity (“one hundred million hearts beating as one,” “eight corners of the world under one roof”), imperial Japan remained at loggerheads with itself. Longstanding divisions and a lack of trust between the people and the nation’s leaders had existed since the 1868 Meiji Restoration. The Imperial Army and Navy had also long held each other in contempt, competing for a share of the national budget, pressuring the already hard-pressed populace to accept what each saw as good for the nation. Media companies seemed fi ckle and volatile: at fi rst, in the early 1930s, they voiced opposition to militarization, then they condoned the Army’s efforts by 1937 in China, fi nally throwing their support behind all-out war even before 1941. 1
It should thus come as no surprise that in the fi rst few days after offi cially announ - cing its surrender on August 15, 1945, Japan remained at odds with itself about the meaning of the war and its defeat. 2 Equally, there was scant agreement about responsibility for the war: the term sensō sekinin (war responsibility) seemed vague. Did it mean responsibility for launching the war against China in the 1930s or later against the Western Allies, for continuing the war when it was clearly already bringing the country to ruin, or for losing the war? At times, various postwar Japanese agencies – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Imperial Army and Navy, and others – postured to monopolize control and at times shared authority. However, more often than not, they did not cooperate and chose instead to protect themselves and their ruling cliques from whatever backlash the imperial defeat held in store. To me it is clear that we should not think of the immediate postwar just as an era of transition or continuity but rather see it as an era in which, consciously and unconsciously, the idea of competitive justice reigned. Japan was looking to salvage what it had not yet lost and aimed to defl ect, to the extent possible, the intrusion of the great powers who seemed so set on returning and once again ruling the world stage. Controlling the postwar conversation about “justice” demonstrated the importance that both the Allies and the Japanese attributed to being able to defi ne the meaning of the war: had it been, as the Japanese claimed, about the “liberation” of Asia or a war of democracy versus fascism as defi ned by the West? The situation in East Asia saw a collection of crumbling imperial spheres – Japan’s and those of former European hegemons – competing for space while two
new ones (the USSR and United States) now vied for dominance. China was able to gain a seat at the international table of elites for the fi rst time at the tail end of World War II, but its ascent to world power did not begin really until the start of the twenty-fi rst century.
