ABSTRACT
Regulatory capitalism involves a constant pursuit for new regulatory technologies or techniques, or ‘better instruments of regulation’, and tends towards complex forms of regulatory regime. 1 The scholars draw on Gunningham and Gabrosky’s notion of ‘smart regulation’ for this component of the theory, under which policymakers harness a range of new regulatory techniques, regulatory actors and the enlightened self-interest of individuals and corporations. 2 In the context of MEWA frameworks, the market has been established as a regulatory instrument to achieve flexible and cost-effective water use objectives, as well as sustainable outcomes. 3 A variety of new transfer techniques have been developed by both government and non-government actors, which are specifically tailored to the environmental water context, and a wide range of funding sources have been generated in order to support those transactions. 4 Innovations have for the most part occurred in the development of tendering mechanisms and banking structures for effecting the acquisition of water rights, the development of the range of transaction types or water products that are able to be purchased, and in relation to public and private funding options for transactions. In Part one I will address transaction institutions, funding options and transaction types in turn. In Part two, I will explore how these new tools have been mobilised in Oregon and Colorado in particular through a range of strategic partnerships between public and private actors, in order to meet the objectives of instream flow programmes.
Funding institutions
