ABSTRACT
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts covered in the preceding chapters of this book. The book observes that the government made a significant effort for fiscal stabilization and indicates that the reform effort by the government of Costas Simitis was associated with the timing of an anticipated sanction, that is entry into or exclusion from the Eurozone. It focuses on Greece sheds light on the distinct properties of a clientelist system of interest intermediation and its impact on the design and implementation of economic reforms. The Greek clientelist system was the consequence of the failure of a post-war system of elite-level rent seeking to secure political stability by means of political exclusion and discrimination. When full political participation was established in 1974, the distributional system opened up to engulf a larger group of beneficiaries. This allowed the two main parties, New Democracy and PASOK, to build strong party structures and reduce within-party and interparty volatility.
