ABSTRACT
Whether egalitarian doctrines of social justice provide reasons to be pro-paternalist or antipaternalist depends on what conceptions of paternalism and what versions of egalitarianism are under review. This chapter considers two conceptions of paternalism – (1) as restriction of a person’s liberty against her will for her own good and (2) as action to improve the condition of a person motivated by negative judgment about her competence. Two versions of egalitarianism are considered – (1) distributive and (2) relational. On the former view, justice requires, to some degree, that people be made equal in lifetime well-being, or that priority should be given to improving the well-being of the worse off. On the latter view, justice requires bringing it about that people relate as equals. The general drift of the discussion is that plausible distributive egalitarianisms in a wide array of circumstances will be pro-paternalist in the sense of recommending paternalism when straight maximizing utilitarianism would not. It is also argued that plausible relational egalitarianisms will favor paternalist policies (on either the restriction of liberty or negative judgment accounts) in some circumstances. Versions of relational egalitarianism that are resolutely antipaternalist can be identified, but will be less plausible that versions that are more tolerant of paternalism.
