ABSTRACT
In one sense, education seems pervasively paternalistic. Teachers and parents act on judgments about what is good for children, often without regard to what the children themselves take their good to be. But in the case of education, it seems, the moral presumption against paternalism is suspended or overcome: paternalism is often taken to be presumptively morally problematic because it involves treating someone like a child. What could be wrong – even presumptively wrong – about treating a child like a child?
As we shall see, education does raise philosophical questions about paternalism. This chapter explores two sets of questions about educational paternalism: First, at what stage does educational paternalism become presumptively morally problematic? In other words: When do children become adults toward whom it is presumptively wrong to act paternalistically? Second, how are we to distribute authority paternalistically to educate children? In particular, how should such authority be shared between parents and the state? This chapter doesn’t defend decisive answers to either set of questions, but it explores approaches that seem plausible.
