ABSTRACT
Introduction Despite the endorsement in 2005 of the principle that every state, as well the international community, has a ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,1 there remain concerns about the principle’s implementation, especially when such implementation involves the use of force. With a view to building broader state support, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon, with the assistance of a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, has published a series of annual reports offering guidance on how best to ‘operationalise’ the R2P concept. The first such report,2 released in early 2009, was welcomed for its embrace of a ‘three pillar’ approach that tapped into state support for the concept’s preventive and capacity-building roles, and the notion of the state as bearing the primary responsibility for the protection of its population. Drawing upon the language of the 2005 resolution, the UNSG’s three-pillar approach identified the protection responsibilities of the state as pillar one, international assistance and capacity-building as pillar two, and the provision of a ‘timely and decisive response’ by the international community when a state is manifestly failing to provide protection as pillar three.3 No set sequence between the three pillars was intended, and nor was one pillar identified as more important than the other – a point highlighted in the report’s front-page summary. Caution was, however, expressed with respect to the international community’s use of military force, with state concerns subsequently heightened by criticism that the UN-mandated intervention to protect civilians in Libya was misused, or abused, so as to achieve regime change. Perceptions can influence international affairs, and the perception that the 2011 Libya intervention exceeded its ‘responsibility to protect’ mandate provoked a strong reaction from states, leading Brazil to call for the adoption of a set of ‘principles, parameters and procedures’ to govern any future exercise of the international community’s responsibility to protect under the proposed banner of a ‘responsibility while protecting’ (RWP).4 The RWP initiative, for its part, has also provoked controversy. For some, the proposal lacked clarity,5 while others viewed it as a threat to a robust vision of R2P at a time when the
consensus was under strain, most notably with regards to action to address atrocities in Syria.6 But for many states, Brazil’s strategic intertwining of the R2P concept with a concept of RWP provided a needed outlet for criticism, while also solidifying support for its starting point. As a constructive step, the Brazilian proposal was based on an understanding shared by many states that any discussion of the R2P concept must respect that concept’s boundaries as agreed in 2005. This understanding is also reflected in the support for a ‘narrow but deep’ approach (with a ‘deeper’ outlook for putting responsibility into practice relying on more than simply military intervention). As explained by the UNSG:
From the outset, the importance of a narrow but deep approach has been highlighted – narrow, in terms of restricting its application to the crimes and violations cited in paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome . . . and deep, in terms of the variety of Charter-based tools that are available for this purpose.7
