ABSTRACT
Israel). This decision provided the impetus for the decade-long Soviet ascendancy in Egypt. Nasser purchased arms from the Soviet bloc in 1954-1955 in return for promised future deliveries of Egyptian cotton. When the United States countered in 1956 by withdrawing proposed financial assistance for the construction of the massive Aswan High Dam, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Egypt and Britain had negotiated an agreement in 1954 that called for the end of British military presence in the canal but allowed Britain to use the military installations in time of crisis. Nasser’s nationalization action weakened Britain’s position. Nationalization itself was not contrary to international law so long as just compensation was paid to the owners of the property. Military actions took place, however, before issues of compensation could be settled. About three months after the nationalization, Israel invaded and captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, stopping short of the Suez Canal. Israel claimed it needed to disrupt Egyptian-based guerrilla raids into Israel; that Egypt’s blockade of the Straits of Tiran severely compromised its vital interests; and that a three-day-old Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian defense pact, accompanied by verbal declarations to destroy Israel, constituted an immediate threat to its security. A couple of days after the Israeli invasion, British and French forces attempted to capture the Suez Canal. Their objective failed, a cease-fire was quickly arranged through the United Nations, and all three invaders subsequently quit Egyptian territory. President Eisenhower led vigorous U.S. efforts leading up to the end of the crisis. United Nations troops were placed in Gaza and at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. The Soviet Union offered to provide financial assistance for the high dam at Aswan. The United States now had more reason than ever to believe that the Soviets were jumping the northern tier. However, Nasser’s policy of nonalignment prevented Egypt from joining the Soviet camp.
