ABSTRACT
Among the central philosophical riddles-both those investigated by philosophers and those fabricated by them anew-there is the thorny issue of the relationship between matters of fact and matters of evaluative judgment. Despite the many different philosophical clothes it has worn, the so called “fact/value dichotomy” has been a constant, and rather uncomfortable, companion of modernity since the scientific revolution. As the finalistic and teleological conception of nature unraveled, the world came to be seen as an inhospitable place for the old ontological furniture of metaphysics: once stripped of its intrinsic meanings and powers, reality became a cold plane of causality upon which we project our values and in the light of which we sort out our preferences. This picture continues to define the modern mindset, and is indeed one of the most lasting inheritances of Enlightenment, despite three centuries of political and cultural upheaval. From a historical perspective, the fact/value dichotomy acts as a kind of cultural-historical landmark, alongside epochal themes of disenchantment, naturalism, and normativity.1
