Finding the condition of finitude (mutanāhī), of whatever admits of priority (pīshī) and posteriority (sipasī), as well as determining the finitude of particular causes (‘illat-hā-i khāṣṣ)

Priority and posteriority are due either to nature (tab‘), such as in the case of numbers, or to suppositions (farḍ) as we make them concerning dimensions – for example, that one can initiate a dimension from any direction according to one’s will. Whatever admits of priority and posteriority due to nature is a quantity (miqdārī). Furthermore, it is limited, since the location of parts belonging to it is specified. The reason for the aforesaid statement is that if it were either a countless measure in things having by nature priority and posteriority, or a quantity such that its elements existed as a totality, then it would be possible to point to a limit or to a boundary of it by means of sensation or by reason.