Finding how the Necessary Existent knows (‘ilm) many things without, however, admitting multiplicity to its essence (dhāt) 1

We ought to realize first of all that the knowledge (‘ilm) of the Necessary Existent is neither like our knowledge nor comparable (qiyās) to it. We should realize, furthermore, that the knowledge which we can possess is of two kinds: one kind necessarily implies multiplicity (bisjārī), whereas the other does not necessarily imply multiplicity. The former is called mental knowledge (‘ilm-i nafsānī), while the latter is called intelligent knowledge (‘ilm-i ‘aqli). An exact description of these two ways of knowing will be presented later. Here a short example is presented. Consider, for instance, an intelligent person engaged either in a debate (munāẓara) or in a discussion (mudhākird) with another person who makes many statements to all of which a response is required. By means of a single thought which comes to the mind of the intelligent person, the answer to all of the questions may be revealed to him, while the answers to particular questions are not formulated separately in his mind. Thus, that which comes from the form in an orderly manner results in thought and words, and constitutes a single thought in the mind. The mind reflects thereafter on the form of the form. The result of this reflection (nigāh) is in fact knowledge which is subsequently expressed in the form of language. Both modes of knowledge are actually knowledge. That person to whom the thought came was previously certain that he knew the entire answer. The second manner of knowing which proceeded from the primary knowledge is a case of actual knowledge. ² The primary mode of knowing something is active (fi‘l) knowledge because it initiates and causes the discovery of the intelligent forms. The other kind of knowledge is a passive (infi‘ālī) knowledge because it is receptive to many intelligent forms. In the latter case, therefore, there must be many forms in the knower. Though there are multiple forms, this multiplicity implies necessarily that the forms should be of one thing, whereas multiplicity is not required at all in the primary mode of knowledge. ³