ABSTRACT
These bodies cannot be many in number (bisyār) and concurrently possess a single nature, for if they were of a single nature (yak ṭab‘), whatever were implied (ḥukm) for one body and its companion would also have to hold for its parts (pāra). 1 Consequently, it must be in accordance with the nature of bodies to be receptive to being united (paiwand padhīr) with each other, as separated portions of water are united. The separation (judā) of each body from other bodies is therefore due to an external cause (sababī bīrūn). This cause is of two kinds. Either (1) there is a distinctly different ground or cause for each body, or (2) these bodies have the same cause or ground. If there is a different cause for each, many problems arise. One problem which we restate at this point is that they have many causes. The question which refers to the causes of things is the same as that about the things themselves – whether or not there are things without matter, subsisting in themselves whose concept is the same without substratum-matter. Their concepts will be identical and their essence ( dhāt) will be the same, as was previously stated. But if their causes were identical and each, moreover, were caused in the same manner (jihat), then only one implication (ḥukm) would be necessary for them, as was mentioned before. Therefore, all of these bodies cannot have the same single nature. Furthermore, they must be capable of being divided and separated, and when they are separated, they must be receptive to a motion which is not circular motion (gīrd). Consequently, these bodies must possess many natures (i.e. all of them do not have a single nature in common) in order that they may be multiple (bisyār) in number. One could not be directed towards a downward (zīr) direction and another towards an upward (zabar) direction, for the nature of the downward direction which is distinct from that of the upward direction would then be another nature having another direction, or it would have that very same nature. One aspect of this nature could accordingly not be downward while the other part was upward, for the downward part would then have to become the upward part. Such a body could therefore become receptive to straight motion if no cause obstructed it. But we have asserted that such a body has no receptivity to straight motion. This lack of receptivity is due neither to natural causation nor to an external causation. Moreover, since these bodies have distinct natures, all of them cannot come from the Necessary Existent, nor from the first being.
