ABSTRACT
An initial striking difference between Gikatilla and Wittgenstein would appear to be that while for Wittgenstein, names are totally simple and essentially unrelated to objects, for Gikatilla names indicate the nature of their objects and thus are effectively descriptions, if one knows how to read them correctly. Wittgenstein argued for the essential contentless-ness of logic: 'all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing'. Analysing Leibniz's logic, Heidegger seems to share in some Wittgensteinian insight: All other truths are reduced to first truths with the aid of definitions or by the analysis of notions. This chapter mentions that there is an on-going tussle in the writings of the early Kabbalists between the divine names YHWH and AHYH. It is immediately clear from the Bible that, while YHWH is the personal name of God, the name which is revealed exclusively to Moses is different, AHYH Asher AHYH.
