ABSTRACT
Britain and the Government of India embarked on the campaign in Mesopotamia for several reasons. The discovery of oil in south Persia in 1901 resulted in the formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The oil produced from this company was supplied to the Royal Navy. Germany’s plan to construct a railway from Constantinople to Baghdad and Basra sent tremors to London and Delhi. Germany’s attempt to operate behind the fac¸ade of Turkish and Persian intrigues threatened the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s pipeline at the island of Abadan, the oilfields and the refineries. Britain was afraid that the Germans might incite the Arab tribes to revolt. Further, capture of Basra by a hostile power would threaten Britain’s sea lines of communication between Egypt and India. India not only supplied men and materials to the British war effort, but also functioned as a base for British power projection at the imperial outposts further east, such as in Singapore
Kaushik Roy
and Hong Kong. By August 1914, Turkey’s attitude towards Great Britain became hostile. On 26 September, the Viceroy (also Governor General) of India, Lord Hardinge, was warned by London that a military expedition might have to be launched at the head of the Persian Gulf. On 16 October, Indian Expeditionary Force D (hereafter IEF D) sailed from Bombay for Bahrain. On 5 November 1914, Britain declared war on Turkey. The next day, IEF D captured the port of Fao.1 The expedition had begun.
