ABSTRACT
Deterrence is a simple concept that is often difficult to put into practice. It involves creating the idea in the mind of the opponent that the gains enjoyed following some action will not outweigh the costs suffered in the wake of a threatened retaliatory blow or creating the impression in the mind of the opponent that a competitor can deny them their objectives through direct military action. A few conditions must be satisfied before threats-involving both conventional and nuclear weapons-actually deter an opponent from some unwanted endeavor. It is generally agreed that the effectiveness of deterrence is increased if threats are communicated clearly so that the opponent recognizes the “red lines” that will lead to the execution of a deterrent threat.1 It makes no sense to surprise an opponent with unanticipated retaliation when a clear signal could have deterred unwanted activity in the first place. It also is generally agreed that deterrent threats require a combination of capability and credibility to be effective. In other words, one must have the capability to act on one’s deterrent threats. Hollow gestures or threats that can somehow be circumvented or defeated carry little deterrent value. Deterrence also has to be credible in the sense that opponents must believe that those making deter rent threats will actually execute the threat if defined red lines are crossed. If opponents believe that the party issuing threats lacks the motivation, will, flexibility, or incentive to act on those threats, then deterrence might not appear credible in the mind of the beholder. Assuming that the deterrence target maintains even a tenuous grasp of strategic realities, the more clearly that deterrent threats are stated, the more unfettered the capability that a party possesses to execute the stated threat, and the stronger the incentive to act on the threat should deterrence fail, the greater are the prospects that deterrence will succeed.
