ABSTRACT
Hobbes’s science of politics rests on a dual analysis of human beings: humans as complex material bodies in a network of mechanical forces, prone to passions and irrationality; and humans as subjects of right and obligation, morally exhortable by appeal to the standards of reason. Traditionally the secondary literature has displayed a greater interest in the latter analysis (Warrender 1957; Nagel 1959; Kavka 1986). However, this article finds the former is equally worthy of attention. Specifically, I claim that for Hobbes’s science of politics to succeed, it must be compatible with the analysis of human beings as potentially irrational material bodies. This compatibility cannot be taken for granted: I argue that although Hobbes does attempt to constrain his science of politics by the results of his material analysis of human beings, he is only partly successful. I argue that critically examining the determination of political actors’ behaviour in a web of causal relations should lead to a serious reconsideration of the conclusions of Hobbes’s science of politics; a reconsideration carried out not by Hobbes within his own oeuvre, but rather in the work of Benedict de Spinoza.
