ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on "representational theories of consciousness", which attempt to reduce consciousness to "mental representations" instead of directly to neural states. It illustrates the examples of representational theories that include first-order representationalism (FOR), which attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed (or first-order) intentional states, and higher-order representationalism (HOR), which holds that what makes a mental state M conscious is that a HOR is directed at M. The chapter discusses a related view, often called "self-representationalism". Rosenthal's view about the extrinsic nature of the HOR has come under attack in recent years and thus various hybrid representational theories can be found in the literature. One interesting recent area of emphasis has been on how HOR and self-representationalism might be realized in the brain. Most representationalists think that their accounts of the structure of conscious states are realized in the brain.
