ABSTRACT

The outbreak of protests in the Arab world, that resulted in a series of regime changes, was as unexpected for Turkey as for other countries, yet it did not take long for the Turkish leadership to seize the events as a golden opportunity to expand Turkey’s role and influence in the region. While actors such as the EU, the US, Russia, and Israel expressed their support for the Arab uprisings but opted for a low-key profile in order not to appear too interfering from the outset (see the articles in this Special Issue), the Turkish Government took the opposite attitude by positioning itself

center stage, claiming regional leadership as an actor eager to spearhead the transitions from autocratic regimes to popular democracies. Capitalizing on its improved relations with Arab countries, and the praise it had been receiving from Western leaders for the country’s ascendancy after a decade of political stability and economic growth, Turkey embarked on a daring path of foreign policy involvement in response to the so-called Arab Spring. Yet this path soon evolved into a turbulent roller coaster ride, which some describe as the rise and fall of the Turkish Model in the region (Samaan 2013). In late 2011, Turkey was referred to as the ‘winner of the Arab Spring’ in

a public opinion poll among five Arab countries. The poll asked respondents to evaluate the international reactions toward recent events in the Arab world (Telhami 2011). The majority of the respondents listed Turkey as playing the most constructive role during the Arab uprisings, while Turkish Prime Minister (PM), Erdogan, was mentioned as the most admired global leader. Other external actors such as the US, Russia, and the UK fared relatively poorly, as did their leaders.1 Yet, three years later, following an increased involvement in regional affairs, Turkey’s popularity in Egypt fell behind that of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are now named as the two most favorable countries (Zogby 2013).2 Other opinion polls in the region point to similar tendencies: Turkey is still perceived as one of the most popular external actors in Arab countries, but the heyday of the ‘Arab Spring, Turkish Harvest’ (Heydarian 2011) is over.3