ABSTRACT
Less than four years after the beginning of the ‘Arabellions,’1 the initial euphoria has faded away. Tunisia remains by and large the only country of the five Arabellion states considered in this special issue which has seen
some significant improvements in the democratic quality of its regime. Bahrain has become more repressive rather than less, while Egypt is quickly reaching pre-rebellion levels of repression with a military dictatorship in power. Libya, which was exposed to external military intervention backed by the UN Security Council, underwent a regime change but has turned into a failing state. So has Syria with one part of the country still being governed by the repressive Assad regime, while other parts are under control of Islamic State (IS) and various other Jihadist groups. The results of the Arabellions are certainly unsatisfactory from a democ-
ratization perspective. Yet, the uprisings still represent a critical juncture in world history, since they demonstrated the aspirations of hundreds of thousands of people in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) regions for human rights and political freedom. At the same time and irrespective of the disappointing outcomes, the Arabellions provide a unique opportunity to explore the foreign policies of the EU and other external actors in response to the events. This is what this special issue has been about. We tried to examine how the EU and other external actors assessed the Arabellions, which goals and instruments they pursued toward the MENA region, and-particularly-how they dealt with conflicting goals, such as supporting human rights and democracy, on the one hand, and preserving security and stability, on the other. This concluding article summarizes the findings from the special issue. In
particular, we compare the reactions of the EU and other external actors, and suggest some generalizable results. Our argument can be summarized in the following points:
(1) The EU, the US, and to some extent Turkey are the only actors considered in this special issue who not only explicitly try to promote human rights and democracy, but also employ specific instruments and resources for this purpose (see also Magen, Risse, and McFaul 2009). But all external actors (including the EU and the US) have prioritized stability and security over democracy as the events unfolded. Particularly, the rise of variants of Islamism became a major common concern. Even the Turkish AKP government under Erdogan did not appreciate the rise of Salafist movements in Tunisia and Egypt, let alone the growing influence of the Islamic State (IS) movement in Syria. When it comes to prioritizing security over democracy, neither the EU nor the US is a special case, but behaved as ‘normal’ powers who seek to balance security with human rights and democracy goals.
