ABSTRACT
The French C.-in-C. was in theory responsible for all of the Mediterranean beyond the immediate vicinity of the Straits of Gibraltar, the Italian area in the Adriatic, the British zone in the Aegean and, of course, the territorial waters of British and Italian possessions. The French C.-in-C. was also the individual who arranged the routes for transport through the Mediterranean and changed them according to circumstances, promulgating his arrangements to the British admirals in the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, Malta and Gibraltar. The British authorities, in turn, implemented them and also brought their local arrangements regarding patrols for the protection of transports and trade in conformity with the French C.-in-C.’s measures on the subject. 1 The submarine war was therefore his problem and the enormity of the task may have had something to do with Lapeyrère’s decision to retire. The number of light forces suitable for anti-submarine warfare was continually changing and growing. The Naval War Staff’s estimate of these, as of 15 November 1915, excluding the Adriatic, is shown in Table 7.1. British and French Anti-Submarine Forces, 15 November 1915
|
Type of Vessel |
British |
French |
Total |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Scouts, sloops and gunboats |
13 |
3 |
16 |
|
Destroyers |
32 |
53 |
85 |
|
Torpedo-boats |
19 |
44 |
63 |
|
Armed boarding steamers and armed yachts |
24 |
1 |
25 |
|
Armed trawlers |
66 |
42 |
108 |
|
Net drifters |
48 |
— |
48 |
|
Minesweeping trawlers and steamers |
60 |
5 |
65 |
