ABSTRACT
Why does frame selection vary across interest groups and across policy debates? The way interest groups frame a debate can have a significant impact on the outcome of a legislative debate. Policy proposals often have a differential effect on various segments of society. Some groups benefit from a policy reform while others are confronted with losses. In addition, legislative proposals are often quite complex, involving a multitude of policy issues that are regulated by one single legislative initiative. As a result, different societal interests might be concerned about different elements of a proposal. Interest groups can strategically highlight some aspects of a proposal while ignoring others to push the legislative debate in a favourable direction (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008). Baumgartner et al. (2008) importantly show the power of framing in their
analysis of the death penalty policy in the United States (US). The longdominant morality frame has been replaced by an innocence frame highlighting the errors in the criminal justice system. The authors convincingly demonstrate that the reframing of the issue put forward by advocates opposing the death
they employ across different policy debates while other groups always use the same frame? In this study, we aim to solve this puzzle by arguing that frame choice can be explained by the interplay between interest group and contextual characteristics. Before we present our own arguments in more detail, it is necessary to clearly
define what we mean by framing as the literature is characterized by conceptual ambiguity. However, central to any conceptualization of framing is that the manner in which certain aspects of reality are expressed has the potential to affect the decision of an actor choosing from a set of possible actions. Druckman (2004) and Chong and Druckman (2007) identify two types of frames: equivalency (or valence) frames and issue (or emphasis) frames. One speaks of equivalency frames when ‘different, but logically equivalent, phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences’ which typically involves ‘casting the same information in either a positive or negative light’ (Chong and Druckman 2007: 114; emphasis original). ‘Issue framing effects,’ Druckman (2004: 672) writes, ‘refer to situations where, by emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker leads individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions.’ In describing the latter, Entman (1991: 53) has described frames as ‘selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others’. We follow Entman (1991) and define a frame accordingly as a specific issue of a policy proposal that is emphasized in a policy debate. Policy proposals typically contain a number of policy issues about which interest groups may have opposing views. For instance, a policy proposal on CO2 emissions from cars recently analysed by Klu¨ver (2009) contained 20 different issues which were debated between stakeholders and policy-makers. Hence, by employing a specific frame, interest groups only highlight one single issue or a subset of advantageous issues that are covered by a proposal, while downplaying less favourable issues. A policy issue is understood as an element of a policy proposal on which interest groups take a position. By contrast, a policy proposal refers to a legislative proposal prepared by the European Commission. A policy or legislative debate describes the process of preparing and adopting a legislative proposal in which both the EU institutions and societal actors discuss the content of the proposal.1 Frame choice is therefore by default a strategic decision, as interest groups deliberately highlight a favourable aspect of a policy proposal to gain advantages in a policy debate. Despite the importance of interest group framing for policy outcomes, we
know remarkably little about how interest groups choose frames in policy debates. In this study, we therefore seek to understand the determinants of interest group frame choice during the policy formulation stage when the European Commission drafts its legislative proposals. We argue that frame choice is a complex process which is simultaneously affected by both interest group and contextual characteristics (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Klu¨ver et al. 2015). With regard to interest group characteristics, we expect that frame choice varies systematically across actor type. With regard to contextual characteristics, we hypothesize that frame choice is affected by institutional properties of the
penalty has led to an important change of public opinion which ultimately resulted in a major public policy change towards the death penalty. Similar framing dynamics are also at play in the European Union (EU). Ringe (2005) demonstrates that political actors involved in an EU policy debate on cross-border takeover bids could successfully change the terms of the debate and ultimately affect the legislative outcome by strategically framing the proposal. Ringe (2009) extends this analysis to a broader set of cases and finds similar framing dynamics. Daviter (2011) shows that framing not only structures political conflict in the EU, but also importantly affects legislative outcomes. Hence, in order to better understand how policy-making in the European Union works, it is crucial to systematically study framing and its impact on policy outcomes. As a result, it is important to better understand interest groups’ frame choice as their framing strategy can have a decisive effect on public policy in the European Union and beyond. Framing therefore constitutes an important lobbying strategy for interest
groups. When policy-makers launch a legislative initiative that affects the policy concerns of interest groups, they have an incentive to shape the outcome of the policy debate in their favour. The way interest groups frame a debate has an impact on the policy options that are considered by decisionmakers and on the final outcome of a legislative debate (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008). Interest groups therefore often strategically highlight some aspects of policy proposals while ignoring others to shape policy debates in their favour. Further, framing is sometimes one of the only tools available to resource-poor interest groups. Many citizen groups that do not have massive lobbying budgets often have only their argumentation to rely upon. The way interest groups frame a policy debate, however, varies. Interest group
characteristics can constrain the types of frames that are plausibly available for an organized interest to deploy. Shell Oil, for example, may not deploy an environmental frame, as it may be seen as insincere. Similarly, Occupy Movement advocates are unlikely to employ pro-business frames. However, the extent to which groups are constrained in their frame choice is an open question, one for which we have, until now, had insufficient data to answer. Furthermore, characteristics of the institutional context may also affect framing choices (see also Klu¨ver et al. [2015]). Mahoney (2008) has previously explored how interest groups used framing strategies to achieve their policy objectives regarding a selected set of EU legislative proposals. She found that about one-third of all interest groups she interviewed strategically adapted their frame choice depending on the context of an EU policy debate. On the face of it, this makes perfect sense; if you are lobbying DG Environment, it would be reasonable to focus on environmental aspects of the debate and then shift to emphasizing economic aspects when lobbying DG Enterprise. However, while that would seem quite obvious to most political observers, the majority of advocates, two-thirds, indicated that they generally stick to the same framing strategy when lobbying the European institutions. So why do some interest groups change the frame type
they employ across different policy debates while other groups always use the same frame? In this study, we aim to solve this puzzle by arguing that frame choice can be explained by the interplay between interest group and contextual characteristics. Before we present our own arguments in more detail, it is necessary to clearly
define what we mean by framing as the literature is characterized by conceptual ambiguity. However, central to any conceptualization of framing is that the manner in which certain aspects of reality are expressed has the potential to affect the decision of an actor choosing from a set of possible actions. Druckman (2004) and Chong and Druckman (2007) identify two types of frames: equivalency (or valence) frames and issue (or emphasis) frames. One speaks of equivalency frames when ‘different, but logically equivalent, phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences’ which typically involves ‘casting the same information in either a positive or negative light’ (Chong and Druckman 2007: 114; emphasis original). ‘Issue framing effects,’ Druckman (2004: 672) writes, ‘refer to situations where, by emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker leads individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions.’ In describing the latter, Entman (1991: 53) has described frames as ‘selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others’. We follow Entman (1991) and define a frame accordingly as a specific issue of a policy proposal that is emphasized in a policy debate. Policy proposals typically contain a number of policy issues about which interest groups may have opposing views. For instance, a policy proposal on CO2 emissions from cars recently analysed by Klu¨ver (2009) contained 20 different issues which were debated between stakeholders and policy-makers. Hence, by employing a specific frame, interest groups only highlight one single issue or a subset of advantageous issues that are covered by a proposal, while downplaying less favourable issues. A policy issue is understood as an element of a policy proposal on which interest groups take a position. By contrast, a policy proposal refers to a legislative proposal prepared by the European Commission. A policy or legislative debate describes the process of preparing and adopting a legislative proposal in which both the EU institutions and societal actors discuss the content of the proposal.1 Frame choice is therefore by default a strategic decision, as interest groups deliberately highlight a favourable aspect of a policy proposal to gain advantages in a policy debate. Despite the importance of interest group framing for policy outcomes, we
know remarkably little about how interest groups choose frames in policy debates. In this study, we therefore seek to understand the determinants of interest group frame choice during the policy formulation stage when the European Commission drafts its legislative proposals. We argue that frame choice is a complex process which is simultaneously affected by both interest group and contextual characteristics (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Klu¨ver et al. 2015). With regard to interest group characteristics, we expect that frame choice varies systematically across actor type. With regard to contextual characteristics, we hypothesize that frame choice is affected by institutional properties of the
penalty has led to an important change of public opinion which ultimately resulted in a major public policy change towards the death penalty. Similar framing dynamics are also at play in the European Union (EU). Ringe (2005) demonstrates that political actors involved in an EU policy debate on cross-border takeover bids could successfully change the terms of the debate and ultimately affect the legislative outcome by strategically framing the proposal. Ringe (2009) extends this analysis to a broader set of cases and finds similar framing dynamics. Daviter (2011) shows that framing not only structures political conflict in the EU, but also importantly affects legislative outcomes. Hence, in order to better understand how policy-making in the European Union works, it is crucial to systematically study framing and its impact on policy outcomes. As a result, it is important to better understand interest groups’ frame choice as their framing strategy can have a decisive effect on public policy in the European Union and beyond. Framing therefore constitutes an important lobbying strategy for interest
groups. When policy-makers launch a legislative initiative that affects the policy concerns of interest groups, they have an incentive to shape the outcome of the policy debate in their favour. The way interest groups frame a debate has an impact on the policy options that are considered by decisionmakers and on the final outcome of a legislative debate (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008). Interest groups therefore often strategically highlight some aspects of policy proposals while ignoring others to shape policy debates in their favour. Further, framing is sometimes one of the only tools available to resource-poor interest groups. Many citizen groups that do not have massive lobbying budgets often have only their argumentation to rely upon. The way interest groups frame a policy debate, however, varies. Interest group
characteristics can constrain the types of frames that are plausibly available for an organized interest to deploy. Shell Oil, for example, may not deploy an environmental frame, as it may be seen as insincere. Similarly, Occupy Movement advocates are unlikely to employ pro-business frames. However, the extent to which groups are constrained in their frame choice is an open question, one for which we have, until now, had insufficient data to answer. Furthermore, characteristics of the institutional context may also affect framing choices (see also Klu¨ver et al. [2015]). Mahoney (2008) has previously explored how interest groups used framing strategies to achieve their policy objectives regarding a selected set of EU legislative proposals. She found that about one-third of all interest groups she interviewed strategically adapted their frame choice depending on the context of an EU policy debate. On the face of it, this makes perfect sense; if you are lobbying DG Environment, it would be reasonable to focus on environmental aspects of the debate and then shift to emphasizing economic aspects when lobbying DG Enterprise. However, while that would seem quite obvious to most political observers, the majority of advocates, two-thirds, indicated that they generally stick to the same framing strategy when lobbying the European institutions. So why do some interest groups change the frame type
