ABSTRACT
In order to test the effect of institutional factors and interest group type on interest group framing while being able to control for policy-related contextual factors, we have constructed a novel dataset on interest group framing across 44 policy debates. The unit of analysis is the frame choice of an interest group in a specific policy debate. We selected the policy debates based on three selection criteria. First, in terms of time period, we selected policy proposals that were adopted by the European Commission between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2010 to be able to obtain position papers from interest groups and to allow for these proposals to pass the entire legislative process before the analysis was completed. Second, in order to control for the impact of policy proposals, we only focused on proposals for directives and regulations which are the only binding legislative acts that are generally applicable. In addition, we included green and white papers that resulted in directives or regulations in our sample in order to cover proposals at different stages of the formal policy agenda. Third, we only selected policy proposals for which the European Commission
has carried out a non-standardized publicly available online consultation. On the basis of a preliminary draft proposal which sets out the envisaged legislative initiative, the European Commission launches a public consultation, which allows interest groups to submit comments expressing their views on the proposed initiative. Using consultations as a selection criterion offers two advantages. First, as the Communication on Minimum Standards on Consultations states, the European Commission only consults on ‘major’ policy initiatives which have a substantial economic, environmental or social impact on society (European Commission 2002: 15). By drawing solely on policy proposals for which the Commission has conducted a consultation, we can therefore focus
groups are prone to use public frames emphasizing, e.g., the implications of a proposal for the environment or human rights. By contrast, we expect that sectional groups have more flexibility when decid-
ing about the most effective frame to influence public policy. Sectional groups do not suffer from the same collective action problems as cause groups, since they represent the economic interests of a clearly circumscribed segment of society so that concentrated costs and benefits are involved, which makes mobilization a lot easier. Hence, while sectional groups have a tendency to employ economic frames linked to their constituents’ interests, they have more flexibility to draw on a broader set of frames. Finally, we expect that firms have the greatest flexibility with regard to frame choice, as they are not at all constrained by any members. Accordingly, we argue that the frame choice of cause groups is most strongly constrained by the logic of membership, which leads them to primarily rely on public frames that reflect the focus of their members on public goods such as environmental protection or human rights. Sectional groups, by contrast, tend to rely on economic frames related to the interests of their constituents, but they enjoy more flexibility to employ a broader set of frames. In comparison, firms show the greatest diversity of frames, since they are not at all constrained by any members.
