ABSTRACT
European interest groups operate in a multi-level system, and many domestic groups have incorporated the EU level in their political action repertoire (Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Du¨r and Mateo 2012). These groups thus lobby in two different contexts: their own national setting and the European Union (EU) level. An important issue is whether the same factors affect group influence at the domestic and EU level. Are some groups more successful at the domestic level and others at the EU level? Do resources matter more for influence at the EU level? And does the national context in which groups operate matter for their ability to be influential in the EU? These issues are crucial for the empirical and normative evaluation of interest group influence in the multi-level EU system (Eising 2008: 1168) and echo a classic theme in the group literature, i.e. whether different arenas provide possibilities for
different types of interests or whether the same groups dominate across political arenas (Schattschneider 1975 [1969]; Truman 1951). In this contribution we amalyse how the lobbying context – defined as the dom-
estic vs the EU level – affects the patterns of perceived agenda-setting influence. More specifically, we are interested in whether the decision-making level acts as a contextual factor, which conditions the potential of key variables when it comes to explaining perceived agenda-setting. We argue that even if embeddedness in domestic institutional structures is a resource which may benefit groups in both national and EU policy-making, it is of prime importance for perceived influence at the domestic level. In contrast, we predict that differences in the state-of-play at the EU and national level allocate group resources the most prominent role for affecting the EU agenda. Finally, we hypothesize that the national context – i.e., whether groups originate in a corporatist or a pluralist country – is less important than usually assumed no matter whether we look at EU or national policy-making. These expectations are tested in a multinomial regression analysis of different degrees of perceived agenda influence at the national and EU level based on survey data with responses from 1,723 domestic interest groups in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK). In developing our argument we draw on a small, but cumulative literature
which has made significant progress in explaining interest group lobbying and access to the EU. It has been demonstrated that the extent to which groups target the EU varies across e.g. group types, policy issues and countries (Beyers 2002; Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Du¨r and Mateo 2012, 2014; Eising 2004; Greer et al. 2008; Klu¨ver 2010). However, in order to determine whether the decision-making level itself acts as a contextual determinant, which conditions the explanatory potential of factors affecting group behaviour, we incorporate the domestic and EU-level policy-making in a single study. The key innovation of our study is the explicit comparison of patterns of perceived group influence on national and EU policy-making in a multi-level design. We also shift the focus from interest group strategies and time usage to group
lobbying success, which despite important exceptions (e.g., Bunea 2013; Klu¨ver 2011; Mahoney 2009) has received limited attention in existing EU studies. Interest group influence may come in many shades – from behind-the-doors attempts to push the political agenda, over lobbying for specific regulatory amendments, to attempts at affecting implementation. Here, we focus on agenda-setting influence, which has received little attention in the literature, whose focal point has been the decision-making phases of policy-making, where it is easier to observe relevant behaviour (Bernhagen and Trani 2012). Our analysis finds that perceived agenda influence on national decision-
makers is considerably higher than on European ones in all countries. However, the substantial variation in in absolute levels of perceived influence on EU and national decision-makers between the three countries is limited, despite their differences in state-society relations. The explanatory potential of other key variables is instead contextually conditioned by the decision-making level. As expected, embeddedness in domestic institutional structures – in
INTRODUCTION
European interest groups operate in a multi-level system, and many domestic groups have incorporated the EU level in their political action repertoire (Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Du¨r and Mateo 2012). These groups thus lobby in two different contexts: their own national setting and the European Union (EU) level. An important issue is whether the same factors affect group influence at the domestic and EU level. Are some groups more successful at the domestic level and others at the EU level? Do resources matter more for influence at the EU level? And does the national context in which groups operate matter for their ability to be influential in the EU? These issues are crucial for the empirical and normative evaluation of interest group influence in the multi-level EU system (Eising 2008: 1168) and echo a classic theme in the group literature, i.e. whether different arenas provide possibilities for
in the multi-level system. However, we expect a differential impact of the two explanatory factors in the spheres of EU and national policy.
