ABSTRACT
Introduction This book has advanced the thesis that separatism is informed by the concept and practice of sovereignty. Of particular importance is the ‘gap’ between sovereignty’s conceptualization as a binary property possessed exclusively by states, and the reality of its exercise as a shared attribute diffused amongst a range of non-/state actors. In addition, because separatism is not a static phenomenon (but alters over time as a group’s membership, objectives and strategic environment change), it is not explicable according to a master narrative or dominant variable. Rather, separatist movements are characterized and driven by a range of divergent features that transform over time. This chapter concludes the discussion by applying these insights to the questions of whether separatism has a future in South Asia and whether the region is moving toward a ‘postseparatist’ era. Earlier, it was noted that different separatist groups exhibit a range of descriptive features and ‘push’ and ‘pull’ motives that incentivized separation from the group’s parent state. The former category of incentive included human rights abuses, economic discrimination and central interference in local matters, whereas the latter referred mainly to perceived benefits of a post-secession state of affairs, such as greater wealth and control over the group’s affairs. The ‘pull’ factors that attract groups to independent statehood – or, more rarely, accession to a neighboring state (as in the case of Kashmir to Pakistan) – are a function of sovereignty and the benefits that it confers. Moreover, just as the composition, ideological convictions, motivations and resources of separatist groups exist in a constant state of flux, the same is true of the institution of sovereignty and its exercise; while the state may be ubiquitous, the control that it exercises over the territory under its jurisdiction is not, and in many ways has over recent decades been substantially altered by forces of economic liberalization and institutional decay. This chapter explores the implications of this finding to explain the decline of separatist (but not political) violence in South Asia. After summarizing data on death tolls from separatist and political violence in South Asia, the chapter briefly reviews the characteristics of sovereignty before exploring how its conceptualization as a binary property that resides exclusively in institutions of
statehood is poorly reflected in the reality of its exercise. While commonly perceived as a binary, non-dependent property possessed exclusively by states, in reality, sovereignty is tenuous, constantly emergent and shared. This disjuncture is evident in both the fanciful moral justifications of state sovereignty and the actuality of its exercise. After exploring some historical and contemporary examples of sovereignty’s multi-layered, inchoate and dispersed character from South Asia and elsewhere, this discussion is then related back to the decline of separatist violence in South Asia through the claim that the retrenchment of state institutions and authority has rendered the state a less attractive possession (and target) for political actors and, consequently, significantly reduced the ‘pull’ factors that incentivize separatism.
